Introduction
1 Statistical attacks on block ciphers make use of a property of the cipher so that an incident occurs with different probabilities depending on whether the correct key is used or not. For instance, differential cryptanalysis [1] considers characteristics or differentials which show that a particular output difference should be obtained with a relatively high probability when a particular input difference is used. Hence, when the correct key is used, the predicted differences occur more frequently. In a classical differential characteristic the differences are fully specified and in a truncated differential [2] only parts of the differences are specified.
On the other hand, impossible differential cryptanalysis [3] uses an impossible differential which shows that a particular difference cannot occur for the correct key (i.e. probability of this event is exactly zero). Therefore, if these differences are satisfied under a trial key, then it cannot be the correct one. Thus, the correct key can be obtained by eliminating all or most of the wrong keys.
However, a recent study by Tezcan [4] showed that it is possible to obtain differentials so that the predicted differences occur less frequently for the correct key. This new cryptanalytic technique is called the improbable differential attack and the impossible differential attack is just a special case of it. Thus, improbable differential cryptanalysis bridges the gap between differential and impossible differential cryptanalysis. Moreover, impossible differential attacks may be improved by expanding them to improbable differential attacks by using the expansion method provided in [4] . The power of this method was shown in [4] by converting the 12-round impossible differential attack on CLEFIA [5] , which is a block cipher developed by SONY Corporation, to 13-round improbable differential attack. This was the best known attack on CLEFIA. However, the resistance of other block ciphers against this technique has not been tested yet.
In this study, we provide the first improbable differential cryptanalysis of reduced round PRESENT [6] , which is an ultra-lightweight block cipher with 31 rounds. We start by introducing a new criteria for evaluating S-boxes.
Undisturbed Bits
Depending on the design of an S-box, when a specific difference is given to the input (resp. output), difference of at least one of the output (resp. input) bits of the S-box may be guessed with probability 1. We call such bits undisturbed. Undisturbed bits are helpful for constructing longer truncated or impossible differentials and they should be avoided by S-box designers to provide more security against these kind of attacks. PRESENT's S-box has 6 undisturbed bits and they are provided below. Proposition 1. If the input difference of the S-box is 9 x , then the least significant bit of the output difference is undisturbed and its value is 0. Proposition 2. If the input difference of the S-box is 1 x or 8 x , then the least significant bit of the output difference is undisturbed and its value is 1. Proposition 3. If the output difference of the S-box is 1 x or 4 x , then the least significant bit of the input difference is undisturbed and its value is 1. Proposition 4. If the output difference of the S-box is 5 x , then the least significant bit of the input difference is undisturbed and its value is 0.
Note that a 4×4 S-box does not necessarily have undisturbed bits. For instance, we observed that 6 out of 8 4 × 4 S-boxes of the block cipher SERPENT [7] have 30 undisturbed bits in total and 2 of its S-boxes have no undisturbed bits.
Without using the undisturbed bits, the longest impossible differential we could find for PRESENT had a length of 4-rounds. However, in this study we show that PRESENT's S-box has 6 undisturbed bits and by using them, we can construct 6-round impossible differentials. Such a 6-round impossible differential is shown in Table 1 . These impossible differentials can be used to provide impossible differential attacks on PRESENT reduced to 8 rounds. In the following section, by further using the undisturbed bits, we construct a 3-round differential with probability 2 −9.29 that can be combined with the 6-round impossible differential. Hence, by using the expansion technique of [4] , we construct a 9-round improbable differential and provide improbable differential attacks on PRESENT reduced to 11 rounds.
3 Improbable Differential Attack on PRESENT-80-11
9-Round Improbable Differential
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X 2,P x 6 = 9 x , x 2 = 9 x 1 extend the 6-round impossible differential given in Table 1 to a 9-round improbable differential by combining it with a 3-round characteristic which is given in Table  2 .
In Table 1 we take input differences of x 8 and x 0 as 9 x only to show that the impossible differential can be combined with the characteristic. If we take the input difference of i s-boxes to be 9 x where 1 ≤ i ≤ 16, the impossible differential still holds.
The total probability of the 3-round characteristic is 2 −12 and hence our 9-round improbable differential holds with probability p i = 2 −12 . However, a closer look at the characteristic shows that this probability is much higher. Because in Table 1 we take input differences of x 6 and x 2 as 9 x only to show that the impossible differential can be combined with the characteristic. If we take the input difference of i s-boxes to be 9 x where 1 ≤ i ≤ 16, the impossible differential still holds. Thus, the first round of the impossible differential is satisfied if the S-boxes x 12 and x 0 at X 1,S have the same differences and the affected S-boxes at X 2,S have the Thus, the probability of our 9-round improbable differential becomes
Note that this probability may be increased further by exhaustively searching every possible outcome or by finding other paths that satisfy the improbable differential.
Attack on PRESENT-80-11
We add two rounds above our 9-round improbable differential and attack 11 rounds of PRESENT-80. Note that the same attack can be applied to PRESENT-128-11 with similar complexities. The 11-round improbable differential path is given in Table 3. 1. Choose 2 n structures of 2 16 plaintexts each where x 3 , x 2 , x 1 and x 0 take all possible values and other bits are fixed. Such a structure of plaintexts propose 2 29.81 pairs where x 3 , x 2 , x 1 have any difference and x 0 has difference
2. Obtain all the ciphertexts and choose only the ciphertexts pairs where x 12 , x 8 and x 4 have any difference, x 0 has difference 1 x or 4 x and other nibbles have the difference 5 x or 0 x just before the final permutation of the last round.
There is a 39-bit filtering condition over the ciphertext pairs and therefore, 2 n−9.19 pairs remain.
3. Guess 16 bits of the key k 31 , k 30 , . . . , k 16 and partially encrypt every plaintext pair. Keep only the pairs where x 0 = 9 x and x 3 , x 2 , x 1 are of the form ?00? after the substitution. This filtering condition has probability 1 4 3 ·7 ≈ 2 −8.81 and 2 n−18 pairs remain. 8 · 2 n−18 ≈ 2 n−24 many pairs to satisfy this property for a guessed key.
6. For every recorded 24-bit subkey with counter less than the treshold T , obtain the remaining 56 bits of the key with exhaustive search.
The attack is on 24 bits of the key and we expect p f a · 2 24 many subkeys to get hits less than or equivalent to threshold T . The probability of satisfying the improbable differential for a wrong subkey is p = [4] can be used to estimate required N to attack with higher success probability. To minimize the time complexity, we select p nd = 1 1000 and p f a = 2 −25 as the input of the Algorithm 1 and we obtain N ∞ = 2 77.75 and T = p 0 ·N ∞ = 6, 537, 411. Thus, the data complexity of the attack is N ∞ = 2 77.75−29.81+16 = 2 63.94 chosen plaintexts and memory complexity is about 2 24 23-bit counters. Time complexity of the first 5 steps of the attack is negligible when compared to step 6 which is 2 55 11-round PRESENT encryptions. Similarly, we can select p nd = 1 1000 and p f a = 2 −2 as the input of the Algorithm 1 to minimize the data complexity. This time the data complexity becomes N ∞ = 2 75.64−29.81+16 = 2 61.83 chosen plaintexts, memory complexity is about 2 24 25-bit counters and the time complexity is 2 78 11-round PRESENT encryptions. These complexities are summarized in Table  4 .
Although these are not the best attacks, they are the first improbable differential attacks on PRESENT. Thus, we observe that undisturbed bits are helpful for constructing longer truncated, impossible or improbable differentials and they should be avoided by S-box designers to provide more security against these kind of attacks.
